War of Attrition
The First World War is usually described as a war of attrition, and in this general history of the conflict William Philpott takes that as his guiding theme, especially as attrition developed into the war’s “determining strategic principle.” Attrition, however, is more a default setting that any war reverts to when equal sides find themselves in a drawn-out struggle. In 1914 it was a type of war that nobody wanted or initially planned for, and when it finally came to pass with the lockdown on the Western front the opposing sides simply had to make the best of it.
I like how Philpott takes an expansive notion of the concept of attrition, bringing factors like morale into the equation. I don’t go all the way with him, however, in his defence of the generals (most notably Haig) and their hit-and-miss execution of a grim strategy they were forced into. Attrition was a strategy, but perhaps not the only or the best one available. It quite easily could have been a losing strategy for the allies had the U.S. not entered the war. And while the generals are often unfairly criticized for being donkeys, I think equally mistaken is the notion that they were doing as well as could be expected and were at least learning all the time. Some did learn, but some didn’t. Some of those who did only did so very slowly. A fair assessment probably lies somewhere in between. We might at least observe that among the generals few stood out, and there were no heroes.